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ABSTRACT 
All organisations, whether in the public or private sector, use computers for the 
storage and processing of information relating to their business or services, 
their employees and their customers. A large proportion of families and 
individuals in their homes now also use personal computers and, both 
intentionally and inadvertently, often store on those computers personal 
information. It is clear that most organisations and individuals continue to be 
unaware of the information that may be stored on the hard disks that the 
computers contain, and have not considered what may happen to the 
information after the disposal of the equipment.  
In 2005, joint research was carried out by the University of Glamorgan in 
Wales and Edith Cowan University in Australia to determine whether second 
hand computer disks that were purchased from a number of sources still 
contained any information or whether the information had been effectively 
erased. The research revealed that, for the majority of the disks that were 
examined, the information had not been effectively removed and as a result, 
both organisations and individuals were potentially exposed to a range of 
potential crimes.  It is worthy of note that in the disposal of this equipment, the 
organisations involved had failed to meet their statutory, regulatory and legal 
obligations. 
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This paper describes a second research project that was carried out in 2006 
which repeated the research carried out the previous year and also extended the 
scope of the research to include additional countries.  The methodology used 
was the same as that in the previous year and the disks that were used for the 
research were again supplied blind by a third party. The research involved the 
forensic imaging of the disks which was followed by an analysis of the disks to 
determine what information remained and whether it could be easily recovered 
using publicly available tools and techniques. 
Keywords:  Computer forensics, disk analysis, data recovery, data disposal. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In January 2005, a joint report (Jones, et al., 2005) was published by the 
University of Glamorgan in Wales and Edith Cowan University in Australia 
detailing the investigation of a number of second hand hard disks revealed that 
a large number of the disks examined still contained significant volumes of 
sensitive information.  The research had been undertaken to gain an 
understanding of the level and type of information that resided on disks that 
had been offered for sale on the second hand market.   
There was a limited amount of evidence from one report (Garfinkel and Shelat, 
2003) and a number of commercially sponsored investigations and newspaper 
reports that there was an ongoing problem with regard to residual data on 
disks, however, before the 2005 report, there did not appear to have been any 
significant prior research into the subject. 
The report identified that the great majority of the disks that were examined did 
still contain significant volumes of information that was considered to be 
sensitive, whether they had originally been used by businesses or in the homes 
of individuals. 
This report contains the initial results of a much wider research project that was 
again carried out by the University of Glamorgan in Wales and Edith Cowan 
University in Australia.  This project was sponsored by British 
Telecommunications (BT) and Life Cycle Services (LCS) and was undertaken 
during 2006 in order to determine whether there had been any change in the 
situation with regard to the level of information that remained on second hand 
hard disks in the intervening period and also to gain an understanding of how 
the results that were obtained compared the situation that was observed in 
results that were obtained from a number of other countries. 
The results for the two sets of research, which were both conducted under the 
same conditions with tools that had similar capabilities, were then compared 
and a number of conclusions and recommendations on ways in which the 
situation could be improved were made. 
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2. THE RESEARCH 
In order to gain realistic results from the research, the number of disks that 
were purchased in the UK and Australia were the same as or more than in the 
previous year.  Nearly two hundred disks were obtained from the UK and 
approximately fifty in Australia.  In addition, a scientifically sound sample of 
disks (in the region of 30) was obtained from both North America and 
Germany.  All of the disks obtained were purchased at computer auctions, 
computer fairs or through eBay in the respective geographic areas. The disks 
were purchased discretely, either individually or in small batches, to minimise 
the possibility of the sellers becoming aware of the end use of the disks. 
As with the previous research, the disks were supplied ‘blind’ to the 
researchers, with the only identifier on the disks being a sequential serial 
number.  That is to say the disks were supplied to the researchers with no 
indication of where or how they had been obtained. The research was 
undertaken replicating the earlier research methodology, with each disk being 
forensically imaged and then placed into secure storage.  All further research 
was carried out on the image of the original disk.  While this may not be 
considered significant, it was thought to be an essential practice, as it allowed 
all of the research to be carried out in a non intrusive manner that did not affect 
or change the data that had been collected. This allowed the potential for other 
investigations to take place in the event of information being discovered during 
the course of the research that might indicate criminal activity or breaches of 
security.  In the 2006 research this was found to have been an essential 
precautionary step, as two of the disks were found to contain material that 
necessitated them being passed to the police for further investigation. 
The tools used to carry out the disk analysis performed similar functions to the 
Windows Unformat and Undelete commands and a hex editor (which can be 
used to view any information that existed in the unallocated portion of the disk) 
and the freely available tool Autopsy in the Linux based Helix Version 1.7 
disk. These types of tool are available to anyone who could obtain the disks. 
The first objective of the research was to determine whether there was any 
information on the disk that was easily visible or recoverable with the tools 
identified above. The second stage of the research was to look for specific 
elements of information that would allow for the identification of the 
organisation or individual that had used the disk and, if possible, further 
information such as the usernames, email addresses or documents, spreadsheets 
and databases.  The purpose of this phase of the research was to determine the 
proportion of the disks that could be traced to an organisation or an individual.   
The research is currently on-going; however, the initial results indicate that in 
both the UK and Australia little has changed in the level of information that 
remains on disks that have been released by organisations.   
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3. SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM 2005 RESEARCH 
In summary, the 2005 research reported that, of the ninety-two disks that were 
obtained in the UK that could be accessed, the following were revealed: 
• 17 percent of the disks were totally blank and contained no file 
structure or data. Information that was made available after the 
analysis revealed that of these, 12 of the 16 disks that contained no 
data had been seeded by the recycling company (Life Cycle 
Services) that had sponsored the purchase of the disks for the 
research, to test its own procedures.  This meant that only 4 (4%) 
of the 92 disks that were obtained on the second hand market were 
totally blank.  
• In 48 percent of the disks that were examined, some attempt had 
been made to remove data. These efforts ranged from the simple 
deletion of files, to a formatting of the disk, to a fresh installation 
of an operating system over the existing operating system.  
• 57 percent of the disks examined contained sufficient information 
to enable the organisation from which they had originated to be 
identified.  
• 51 percent of the disks contained details from which individuals 
could be identified.  
• 20 percent of the disks contained financial information relating to 
the organisations, including staff salary details, sales receipts and 
profit and loss reports.  
• 8 percent of the disks contained details of the network 
infrastructure of the organisations from which they had originated, 
including server names, proxy numbers and other IP numbers.  
• 4 percent of the disks contained potentially illicit (pornographic) 
data. In the form of either illicit photographs or references to sites 
that appeared to contain illicit material.  
The results of research conducted in Australia in 2004 and 2005 (Valli 2004; 
Jenkins 2005) showed a situation very similar to that which was revealed by 
the research in the UK. Of the 23 disks examined in the Australian research, 
information on 21 of the disks was easily recoverable, one hard disk had been 
erased and one hard disk had mechanical failure.  It became apparent that some 
of the disks had come from systems belonging to critical infrastructure 
providers in the form of power generation, water and telecommunications 
utilities; a particular concern as the files systems  were intact and required a 
simple power on in compatible hardware. 
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4. RESULTS OF 2006 RESEARCH 
The 2006 research was undertaken to determine whether the situation had 
changed in the intervening period and whether organisations and individuals 
had taken steps to address the issues that were revealed during the earlier 
report.  
The initial 2006 research has revealed that, while there have been some 
changes, the results, as in the previous research, show that a significant number 
of disks still contain information that could be considered sensitive. This would 
appear to highlight two separate points.  The first is that the situation with 
regard to the disposal of hard disks in the countries that had not been 
previously been surveyed is producing results that are very similar to those that 
have been observed in the UK and Australia. The second is that, despite an 
increasing awareness as a result of publicity from a number of information 
losses and incidents of identity theft and the results of a number of surveys 
(Synovate 2003; Price Waterhouse 2006; Johannes 2006) and increasing level 
of regulation, organisations are not modifying their procedures to ensure that 
information is effectively removed before the disposal of the computer 
hardware.   
The initial results from the disks analysed to date in the 2006 research have 
revealed a small increase in the number of disks that have been effectively 
wiped, but that 44 percent of the disks have recoverable data in the slack space 
and 24 percent of the disks still have file structures present from which the data 
could be easily recovered. 
Detailed below are the initial results of the 2006 research, reported by country.  
For the disks analysed in the UK: 
• Of 200 disks obtained, 82 (41%) were unreadable and failed to 
spin up. 
• 37 (31% of the readable disks) were totally blank and no data 
could be recovered from them. 
• 25 (21% of the readable disks) contained sufficient information for 
the organisation that they had come from to be identified. 
• 24 (20% of the readable disks) contained sufficient information for 
individuals to be identified. 
• 18 (15% of the readable disks) contained information on personnel 
and of a personal nature. 
• 12 (10% of the readable disks) contained financial information on 
the organisation or individual from which they had originated, 
including: 
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• An Automotive Company 
• A Child Day care centre 
• Local Government 
• A Financial services organisation 
• A retail store 
• 1 (1% of the readable disks) contained information of a paedophile 
nature and has been reported to the police. 
• 12 (10% of the readable disks) contained information that might be 
considered as illicit. 
For the 24 disks that were obtained from North America: 
• 12 (50% of the disks) were physically damaged and could not be 
accessed 
• 1 (8% of the readable disks) had been wiped and contained no data. 
• Of the remaining 11 readable disks,  
• 5 (42% of the readable disks)had come from commercial 
organisations and  
• 6 (50% of the readable disks) appeared to be from individuals. 
• 3 (25% of the readable disks) contained illicit material. 
For the 40 disks that were obtained from Germany: 
 29 (72% of the disks) were not in working order and could not be 
accessed. 
 5 (45% of the readable disks) had been wiped and contained no 
data. 
 Of the remaining 6 (55% of the readable disks), 2 had come from 
commercial organisations and 2 appeared to be from individuals. 
The source of the other 2 disks has not yet been determined. 
For the 53 disks that were obtained from Australia: 
• 3 (6%) of the disks were physically damaged and could not be 
accessed 
• 18 (36% of the disks) had been wiped and contained no data. 
• Of the remaining 32 (60%),  
• 14 (43%) could be identified as having come from commercial 
organisations and  
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• 9 (28%) appeared to be from individuals. 
• 2 (6%)of the disks contained illicit material 
The table below shows a comparison of the results of the 2005 and the 2006 
disk surveys. 
 2005 2006 
Total Number of Disks UK and Australia 116 253 
Faulty/Unreadable 13 (13 %) 90 (36 %) 
Wiped 17 (16 %1) 73 (45 %1) 
Commercial Data Present 60 (70 %2) 42  (47 %2) 
Individual data present 51 (59 %2) 44  (49 %2) 
1 Percentages are of the readable disks 
2 Percentage of readable disks that had not been wiped 
Table 1: Comparison of results of all of the disks in the 2005 and 2006 surveys 
These raw results appear to indicate that there has been a significant change 
between the results obtained during 2005 and 2006, with a significant increase 
in the proportion of disks that were faulty and also a increase in the number of 
disks that had been wiped effectively. This has had the effect of reducing the 
proportion of disks that contain either commercial or individual data. Table 2 
shows a comparison of the results from the disks obtained in the different 
regions. 
 UK Australia Germany North 
America 
Total Number of Disks 
Analysed 
200 53 40 24 
Faulty/Unreadable 87 (43%) 3 (6%) 30 (75%) 12 (50%) 
Wiped 55 (49%1) 18 (36%1) 4 (40%1)  1 (8%1) 
Commercial data present 28 (35%2) 14 (44%2) 4 (66%2) 6 (50 %2) 
Individual data present 35 (44%2) 9 (28%2) 3 (50%2) 7 (58 %2) 
1 Percentages are of the readable disks 
2 Percentage of readable disks that had not been wiped 
Table 2:  A comparison of the results from the disks obtained in the different regions 
The results from the individual countries reveal what appear to be two 
significant disparities.  The first is that the number of disks that were 
unreadable varied from 6 percent in Australia to 75 percent in Germany. The 
number of disks that were obtained in these two countries was not significantly 
different and there is no obvious reason for the large difference in findings.  
The second is that in the UK in 2006, the percentage of disks that had been 
wiped had increased to 49 percent from 16 percent in 2005, but the first results 
from the USA in 2006, with only 8 percent of the disks wiped are significantly 
different.   
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These are the first two sets of results from the UK and Australia that are 
available and the first from the USA and Germany and because of this, they 
may not be fully representative of the overall situation.  It will be necessary to 
monitor the situation over a period of at least three more years to determine 
whether there are any significant patterns developing. 
The type of material that was recovered from the disks that originated in 
commercial and academic establishments included: 
From a major automotive company, there was payroll information, internal 
telephone contact details including mobile phone numbers, details of the 
internal network configuration and copies of invoices and orders.  In 
addition there were also emails between the company and its customers, 
meeting minutes and communications that were intended as written 
warnings to staff relating to poor performance.  
From a North American ship building company, there was information on 
the names of some employees, photos of employees, photos of the 
company site, and of ships (including the name of one vessel) and 
company emails, referring to ship re-fits and visiting guests.  The 
recovered information also included details of the visit of a senior Local 
Government official and his wife regarding the re-dedication of a Merchant 
Ship and recovered emails included bids for contracts for Naval work 
which required TOP SECRET security clearances to work on the contract.  
There was also personal information recovered that would have been 
embarrassing for the individual to which it referred and a quantity of 
pornographic material that may have created the potential for blackmail.  
From a British construction company, the information that was recovered 
contained internal memos, user names and telephone numbers. Emails 
were present and some personal information such as a Curriculum Vitae 
(résumé).  In addition, information was recovered on the network 
infrastructure which contained some IP addresses and network information 
referring to the company data centre. 
Data from a disk recovered from an academic institute, a community 
college, included the names and web surfing habits of the users, the names 
of teachers, some confidential emails and possible information from the 
school SIMS system.  There was also data that is thought to be test scores 
for individual children that was held in a database. 
Data from a disk that appears to have originated in a local government 
housing office made it possible to identify the main user, and contained 
information on complaints relating to the housing office, lists of repairs, 
contacts, lists of information for different sections of the council in 
addition to email. It also included personal information for the main user 
including a Curriculum Vitae, a wedding invitation, and a surprise birthday 
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party for the user’s partner. 
The type of material that was recovered from the disks that originated in 
commercial and academic establishments included: 
Illicit information including downloaded audio and video files.  A number 
of cases of pornographic material were encountered and also one case of 
paedophile material (this has been referred to the police for further 
investigation).  There were also cases of family financial details including 
bank accounts and credit cards, details of personal habits and email and 
ICQ discussions.  Additionally, there were also details of family names, 
addresses and photos, details of a family’s holiday itinerary and 
information on a music festival. In one case there was evidence that one of 
the users had subscribed to online newsgroups such as 
alt.binaries.erotica.teen.female.newsgroups. 
In another case there were details of a family (a mother, father and 2 
daughters) that ran a restaurant. The information recovered included menus 
for the restaurant and staff names. The information recovered also included 
the daughters’ school work and numerous photos of friends and  
boyfriends (?) and a number of emails relating to a Canadian holiday and 
the visit of the Canadian friends to the UK. 
The disposal of disks that have not been wiped effectively and that may still 
contain significant information is not a new issue. As early as 1993, an article 
in the Canadian Globe and Mail (Canadian Globe and Mail 1993) reported that 
a second hand hard disk that had been sold to an Edmonton man that contained 
confidential personnel files on 166 employees of an Alberta organisation.  A 
paper presented at a 1996 conference (Gutmann 1996) discussed the subject of 
the secure deletion of data. A report (Cullen 2000) appeared in ‘The Register’, 
regarding the disposal by the Morgan Grenfell Asset Management merchant 
bank of a disk that contained details of Sir Paul McCartney’s bank account. A 
second paper by (Gutmann 2001) examined Data Remanence in 
Semiconductor Devices and then another paper (Garfinkel and Shelat 2003) 
examined ways in which disks could be ‘sanitized’.  In 2004, an article 
(Leyden 2004) published in the Register reported that a mobile security group 
called Pointsec Mobile Technologies had purchased a hard disk for £5 through 
eBay that contained a customer database and the current access codes to what 
was supposed to be a secure Intranet of a large European financial services 
group. Finally in 2005, there were a number of reports including: 
One in May (TechWeb News 2005) indicating that 70% of second hand 
hard disks still contained data and one in September (BBC News), which 
reported the information found by Disklabs on 100 disks that they had 
obtained. 
Given the level of exposure that the subject has received over a considerable 
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period, the availability of suitable tools1 to ensure the safe disposal of 
information, increasing legislative pressure and the increasing literacy of 
computer users over the period, there is now little excuse in the public and 
business sectors for ensuring that disks are effectively cleaned before disposal.   
In the case of disks that have come from the home environment it is, perhaps, 
easier to understand as home users will not necessarily have the knowledge or 
tools available to clean a disk before disposal.  On the other hand, with the 
increasing publicity with regard to identity theft and fraud, it would seem to be 
reasonable to expect that they would be very cautious and take significant steps 
to ensure that their personal information was removed before they disposed of 
the disks. 
The implications of these failures to adequately remove the data are that, as a 
result of a breakdown in their corporate or individual security or inadequate 
management of the procedures for the disposal of equipment, information 
continues to be available to people who may seek to exploit it. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
While there has clearly been an improvement since the previous research in 
2005 in the proportion of disks that have been effectively wiped (up from 17% 
in 2005 to 31% in 2006 in the UK and up from 4% in 2005 (1 in 23) to 36% in 
2006 in Australia) this still represents less than half of the disks that could be 
read.  The increased number of disks that had been effectively wiped has 
reduced the proportion of the disks that contain sensitive organisational or 
personal information, but this type of information was still found on more than 
one in four of the disks that could be accessed. 
Perhaps the most significant change was in the proportion of disks that were 
purchased that could not be accessed, with a huge 36 percent of the disks being 
faulty.  Whilst it is accepted that the purchase of second hand disks is normally on 
an ‘as seen’ basis, this high a level of faulty disks seems inordinately high and 
cannot be attributed to damage in transit or any other single cause.  It was notable 
that the overwhelming majority of the disks obtained in Germany were faulty.   
There remains a clear requirement for the education and training of the relevant 
staff within organisations and of home users to inform them of the potential 
problems that arise from the failure to properly remove the information from 
disks and systems that are leaving their control and to make them aware of the 
potential costs to their organisations and the individuals of this failure. When 
organisations dispose of surplus and obsolete computers and hard disks, they 
must ensure that, whether they are handled by internal resources or through a 
third party contractor, adequate procedures are in place to destroy any data and 
also to check that the procedures that are in place are effective. 
                                                 
1 Such as the Blancco tool which is approved for use by the UK Government. 
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6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The type of measures that organisations and individuals could be taken to 
reduce the volume of information that is inadvertently released when 
equipment is disposed of includes: 
1. A general public awareness campaign and the wide publication of 
information on the risks of data leakage and measures that can be 
taken to prevent it.  This could be carried out by the Government, 
the media, industry or academia. 
2. Organisations should carry out a risk assessment to determine the 
level of assurance that is required that all information has been 
removed from the disks. 
3. Organisations should introduce procedures to ensure that computer 
systems and computer hard disks that are disposed of are properly 
cleaned and that all data is erased to an appropriate standard. This 
could include steps such as a process to validate the effectiveness 
of internal data removal procedures to an identified standard or 
checks to ensure that any third party contractor has cleaned the 
disks to an adequate standard. 
4. An alternative step that organisations could be introduced is the 
physical destruction of the disks. 
5. The information and communications technology industry could 
make available the tools and facilities to enable individuals to 
effectively remove the information from their computers before 
they are recycled. 
6. Individuals and organisations should consider the full encryption 
of hard disks so that if the disk is lost or the data is not effectively 
removed, it will not be easily recoverable. This would provide 
adequate protection in most situations. 
7. CONTRIBUTING ORGANISATIONS 
British Telecommunications (BT). BT is one of the world's leading providers of 
communications solutions serving customers in Europe, the Americas and Asia 
Pacific. Its principal activities include networked IT services, local, national and 
international telecommunications services, and higher-value broadband and 
internet products and services.  In the UK, BT serves more than 20 million 
business and residential customers with more than 30 million exchange lines, as 
well as providing network services to other licensed operators. 
 
Life Cycle Services (LCS). LCS is the UK’s leading specialists in the asset 
refurbishment, redeployment and secure disposal of information and 
communication technology.  
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Edith Cowan University (ECU).  The Security and Intelligence research cluster 
of the School of Computing and Information Science at ECU conducts research 
into all aspects of Information Operations from the technological aspects of 
computers and network security to the ‘softer’ side involving issues such as 
perception management and information policy.  At present, its research theme 
is ‘deception’.  The group has numerous doctoral, masters and honours 
candidates.  Its main areas of interest are information operations, 
computer/network forensics, RFID security, mobile computing security, 
honeypots and the use of deception in security. 
University of Glamorgan (UoG). The Information Security Research Unit in 
the School of Computing at the UoG has a strong and well established theme in 
the areas of Network Security, computer forensics and the threats to 
information systems.  The Unit is focused on the issues associated with the 
design and development of early warning systems that are capable of detecting 
and responding to a variety of cyber based attacks, and on the issues associated 
with computer forensic science.  In particular, they are developing technologies 
such as secure XML, threat assessment methods, vulnerability management, 
IDS data integration, data mining, data fusion and secure wireless mobile 
computing.  The unit has two specialised laboratories, the Network Security 
Laboratory and the Computer Forensics Laboratory. 
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